THE CLASS DEFENSE: WHY DISPERSED
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DEFENDANTS
NEED PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS
JONATHAN REICH 1
ABSTRACT
“The concern of this Court is that in these
lawsuits, potentially meritorious legal and
factual defenses are not being litigated, and
instead, the federal judiciary is being used as
a hammer by a small group of plaintiffs to
pound settlements out of unrepresented
defendants.” –Judge S. James Otero 2
Current procedural rules have failed to keep up with
trends in intellectual property litigation. The rise of
digital media, the use of the Internet for mass distribution,
and the increasing vigor with which copyright proprietors
protect their legal interests has led to an increase in
litigation on behalf of corporate plaintiffs against
dispersed, non-commercial defendants. These cases take
advantage of a procedural oversight, one which affords
plaintiffs the ability to aggregate their cases against
dispersed defendants who are unable to utilize a common
defense. A class defense would level the playing field
between plaintiffs and defendants, avoid default
judgments, and protect defendants with valid defenses
from settling negative expected value suits.
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INTRODUCTION
¶1
The Digital Age and the rise of the Internet ushered
many changes to American life. Among them is an
increasingly common litigation paradigm: powerful
commercial plaintiffs sue many dispersed, noncommercial
defendants. While substantive law struggles to keep up with
changes in technology, 3 procedural law is even more deficient
in coping with this new paradigm.
¶2
Part I of this iBrief discusses the peculiar structure
which the recording industry's litigation against end-users has
taken: where plaintiffs are concentrated and defendants are
dispersed. Part II explains how the recording industry has
developed a litigation strategy which replicates a private mass
tort adjudication system. Part III touches on the economic
ramifications of an individual defendant choosing to defend a
lawsuit. Parts IV and V introduce the class defense and
briefly explain how it may be employed by defense counsel to
aggregate the claims of noncommercial defendants.
I. CONCENTRATED PLAINTIFFS, DISPERSED DEFENDANTS
¶3
Many corporations measure their wealth not by how
many assembly lines or natural resources they own, but rather
by how much intellectual property they possess. The rise of
digital media and the Internet is a double-edged sword for
these companies. The Internet presents an opportunity to
lower the costs of distribution. However, it also increasingly
exposes electronic media to copyright infringement, which
diminishes the value of their capital goods.
¶4
In September 2003, ten corporations, including the six
largest film studios and the four largest recording studios,
launched the most expansive litigation campaign ever, acting
as plaintiffs against tens of thousands of unidentified
3

See, e.g., Ponder v. Pfizer, Inc., 522 F.Supp.2d 793, 797 (M.D. La. 2007)
(“Given the rate at which Internet technologies evolve, the ability of computer
hackers to stay two-steps ahead of the latest in online security, and the
comparatively slow speed at which the law responds to cyber-security threats,
neither Louisiana courts nor the Fifth Circuit have confronted the issue before
us.”).
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defendants. 4 They alleged that thousands of individuals
violated the Copyright Act by trading digital copies on peerto-peer online networks.
¶5
Initially, the plaintiffs were successful in their
litigation strategy against non-commercial, and often
unrepresented, defendants.
Most of these individual
defendants lacked the resources to litigate potentially valid
claims. 5 Many of these actions were ex parte proceedings. 6
These cases represent a unique form of litigation: one
plaintiff initiates litigation against a large number of
defendants for a small sum in each suit. The plaintiff is a
sophisticated corporate entity and the dispersed defendants
are typically individual, non-commercial users.
¶6
The typical end-user lawsuits were filed against Doe
defendants in districts where an Internet Service Provider
(ISP) had a server. 7 Often 200 or more individual cases were
aggregated into a single action. 8 The filing was usually
followed by a motion for immediate discovery and subpoenas
served on the ISPs, which allowed the Recording Industry
Association of America (RIAA), an industry trade group to
which the plaintiffs belong, to convert IP addresses into filesharer identities. The average, non-negotiable settlement,
standardized by the RIAA, was approximately $3,000. 9

4

See Press Release, RIAA, Recording Industry Begins Suing File Sharers Who
Illegally Offer Copyrighted Music Online (Sept. 8, 2003), available at
http://www.riaa.com/newsitem.php?news_month_filter=9&news_year_filter=20
03&resultpage=2&id=85183A9C-28F4-19CE-BDE6-F48E206CE8A1.
5
See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F.Supp.2d 1210 (D. Minn.
2008) (represented pro bono).
6
See, e.g., Interscope Records v. Does 1-14, 558 F.Supp.2d 1176 (D. Kan.
2008); Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Does 1-3, 371 F.Supp.2d 377 (W.D. N.Y.
2005).
7
David Opderbeck, Peer-To-Peer Networks, Technological Evolution, and
Intellectual Property Reverse Private Attorney General Litigation, 20
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1685, 1705 (2005).
8
Id. at 1704; see also Press Release, RIAA, RIAA Brings New Round of
Lawsuits Against 751 Online Music Thieves (Dec. 15, 2005), available at
http://riaa.org/newsitem.php?news_month_filter=&news_year_filter=2005&resu
ltpage=&id=2E9599A7-91FB-739F-CACB-77EE7118AF1C.
9
See Transcript of Q&A with RIAA President Cary Sherman, DAILY TEXAN,
March 25, 2004, available at
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¶7
These suits were never intended for trial. They were
intended to deter future file-sharing more than they were
intended to obtain money damages. 10 According to one
attorney, in 40,000 RIAA cases against end-users, the RIAA's
investigator was never deposed and only once was the RIAA's
expert deposed. 11 In that deposition, the RIAA expert
admitted that neither he nor the investigator could withstand a
Daubert hearing for admissibility if these cases were to go to
trial. 12
¶8
Most file sharing actions ended in a take-it-or-leave-it
settlement agreement, unreviewed by any court. 13 Most
content actions, typically aimed at non-commercial users of
YouTube and MySpace, have been resolved with Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) take-down notices. This
resulted in material being removed from the Internet which
under existing copyright law created no liability for the
defendant. 14 Commentators noted that “RIAA end-user
litigation appears to be nearly the opposite of mass tort
litigation. . . . [And the] structure of the litigation is inverted.
[While] mass torts typically involve numerous consumers
suing big business, [sic] the RIAA litigation involves big
business suing numerous consumers.” 15
¶9
The RIAA's end-user litigation strategy highlights the
lack of procedural protections afforded to dispersed
defendants. These defendants face the same collective action
and economic disincentives to litigate as typical class
plaintiffs. However, dispersed defendants are not afforded
the same procedural protections as dispersed plaintiffs, even
when they meet the common criteria that bind a plaintiff
http://www.dailytexanonline.com/media/paper410/news/2004/03/25/Focus/Tran
script.Of.Qa.With.Riaa.President.Car-641217.shtml.
10
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 962–63
(Breyer, J., concurring); see also Press Release, RIAA, RIAA Continues
Enforcement of Rights With New Lawsuits Against 784 Illegal File Sharers
(June 29, 2005), available at http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/062905.asp.
11
Ray Beckerman, Content Holders v. The Web: 2008 US Copyright Law
Victories Point to Robust Internet, 12 No. 7 J. INTERNET L. 16, 20, 2009.
12
Id. at 20.
13
Opderbeck, supra note 7, at 1689.
14
Id. at 1705.
15
Id. at 1702–03.
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class. As a result, some defendants have valid defenses, but
choose to settle because litigation would be cost prohibitive.
While the factual situation of end-user litigation can be
thought of as the opposite of a mass tort, the judicial system's
handling of the problem is radically different. The remedy
would be a method of aggregating defense claims.
II. THE RIAA'S PRIVATE MASS TORT SYSTEM
¶10
End-user litigation is, in many ways, the opposite of
traditional mass tort litigation. Both situations present a
single party adverse to many small, dispersed parties. Also,
the single party has an advantage of scale and avoids the
collective action problem. 16 This imbalance provides a
disincentive for dispersed parties to litigate, and may lead to
unfavorable settlements or to neglecting valid legal claims.
¶11
In fact, the RIAA's litigation strategy can be
characterized as a mass tort action and resolution system: the
recording industry plaintiff files large bundled claims, obtains
all of the relevant discovery in one judicial forum, and then
settles individual claims on standardized terms. By contrast,
in a conventional mass tort, the plaintiffs band together with
the power of a class action and often negotiate a settlement
with the defendant. Settling defendants are typically released
of all past and future claims, and in some instances the global
settlements allow them to avoid regulatory shut-down or
bankruptcy. 17 In contrast, the end-user copyright defendant
pays $3000 to receive a “promise” instead of a legally binding
release from future lawsuits for activity prior to the
settlement.
¶12
By permitting claims against non-residents of the
forum state 18 and issuing discovery orders, 19 most district
16

See, ¶15, infra.
See Joseph Rice & Nancy Davis, The Future of Mass Tort Claims:
Comparison of Settlement Class Action to Bankruptcy Treatment of Mass Tort
Claims, 50 S.C. L. REV. 405 (1999); see, e.g., Master Settlement Agreement,
November 1998, available at http://www.naag.org/backpages/naag/tobacco/msa
(settling tort claims between four cigarette producers and Attorneys General
from forty six states); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 883 (1999)
(proposing settlement to avoid defendant's bankruptcy).
18
See, e.g., Sony Music Entm’t, Inc. v. Does 1-40, 326 F.Supp.2d 556, 567
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (stating it is likely that Doe defendants were not residents,
17
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courts have tacitly endorsed this litigation strategy. Some
courts, however, have issued orders severing these cases for
improper joinder of claims. 20 Of the severing courts, some
have noted in the accompanying order that the RIAA may
have consciously attempted to avoid paying separate filing
fees. 21 Judges who have severed cases usually cite Rule
20(a)(2)(A), which requires the right to relief to arise “out of
the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences.” 22 Since there was no allegation that the Doe
defendants were acting together or in a series of transactions,
these courts reasoned that joinder was inappropriate. 23
¶13
End-user litigation will likely increase as content
providers become increasingly concerned about piracy of
their products. 24 If so, the procedural asymmetry between
plaintiffs and defendants will continue to be exacerbated by
the lack of procedural structures addressing the imbalance
between a single, powerful plaintiff and dispersed, noncommercial defendants.
however personal jurisdiction arguments were premature). Due to the cost of
filing a 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction or a motion
for forum non conveniens, most claims are settled rather than litigated.
19
See, e.g., Elektra Entm’t Group, Inc. v. Does 1-6, No. 04-1241, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22673 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2004) (authorizing expedited discovery to
“all current and future cases filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania” related
to the above-captioned case).
20
See, e.g., Order, Interscope Records v. Does 1-25, No. 6:04-cv-197-Orl22DAB (M.D. Fla. Apr. 27, 2004); Order, BMG Music v. Does 1-203, No. 04650 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2004); Order at 3, Motown Record Co., L.P. v. Does 1252, No. 1:04-CV-439-WBH (N.D. Ga. Aug. 16, 2004); Order at 8-9, Arista v.
Does 1-100, No. 1:04-CV-2495-BBM (N.D. Ga. Feb. 1, 2005).
21
See e.g., In re Cases Filed By Recording Companies
http://w2.eff.org/IP/P2P/RIAA_v_ThePeople/20041117_austin_severance_order
.pdf (stating “The filing fees for the recent four cases totaled $600, whereas the
filing fees of 254 separate cases would have been $38,100. That is a significant
loss of revenue to the public coffers,” before dismissing charges against 250 of
the defendants sua sponte.). See also Arista Records, LLC v. Does 1-11, No.
1:07-2828, 2008 WL 4823160 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (under Rule 21 a judge may
sua sponte rule on the joinder issue before any other, and that postponing a
ruling on joinder results in lost revenue approaching a million dollars and
encourages music industry plaintiffs to continue misjoining defendants).
22
See id.
23
See id.
24
Opderbeck, supra note 7 at 1689.
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¶14
Consolidation or aggregation of the dispersed claims
would level the playing field between plaintiffs and
defendants. Currently, however, only plaintiffs have a
functional aggregation device. 25 Because of the lack of
procedural protection for dispersed defendants, the judicial
system has inadvertently established a near-absolute liability
regime. All that a commercial plaintiff must do is threaten to
sue dispersed end-users and then collect settlement payments.
III. CLASS ACTIONS AND THE ECONOMIC INCENTIVE TO LITIGATE
¶15
Dispersed plaintiffs use class actions to overcome the
collective action problem faced by numerous individuals who
have all suffered a similar harm perpetrated by a common
defendant. In many instances these individual harms are too
small to make litigation a viable option, either because the
economic value of each claim is low or because the plaintiffs
are seeking injunctive relief instead of monetary
compensation. The aggregation provided by the class action
device, embodied in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, allows plaintiffs to bring suits with low individual
economic value. 26 A multitude of low-value claims may be
aggregated to make litigation economically worthwhile. One
court explained that without a plaintiffs’ class action, a
powerful corporate defendant could knowingly overcharge
each customer by a small amount, “fully aware that relatively
few, if any, customers will seek legal remedies,” that those
remedies will not have a collateral estoppel effect, and that
“[t]he potential for millions of customers to be overcharged
small amounts without an effective method of redress cannot
be ignored.” 27
¶16
Defendants in traditional class actions are also able to
reduce their cost of litigation through economies of scale
when multiple lawsuits share common questions of law or
25

See Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, The Class Defense, 93 CAL. L. REV.
685, 689, 696-708 (2005) (hypotheticals and case studies which “vividly
demonstrate the failure of the existing legal regime to adequately protect
dispersed defendants.”).
26
See, e.g., Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338-39 (1980)
(recognizing that the class device enables plaintiffs “to bring cases that for
economic reasons would not be brought”).
27
Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1108 (Cal. 2005).
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fact. For example, defendants can pay once and then reuse
much of the same research, memoranda, and experts when
there are common questions between claims. This allows the
defendant to spread its litigation costs across multiple
lawsuits.
¶17
This aggregative effect allows a plaintiff class of
Davids to form their own litigation Goliath. Thousands of
small claims against a common defendant are litigated in one
action, creating economies of scale for the plaintiffs and
converting negative expected value claims into positive
expected value ones.
¶18
However, the contrary paradigm has garnered
relatively scant academic attention. 28 In end-user litigation,
multiple dispersed defendants have allegedly all wronged a
single plaintiff in the same way, with common questions of
law pervading each tortious action. Why have dispersed
defendants not been allowed to pool their litigation resources
as well?
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO REMEDY THE DISPARITY
¶19
End-users may have a variety of valid defenses, such
as actual innocence or fair use; however, it is economically
unfeasible for them to litigate as defendants. Once they enter
into the form settlement agreement offered by the RIAA, they
are prevented from later suing as plaintiffs. This contrasts
with a class plaintiff who can choose to pay an overcharge
and decide to sue for recovery later.
¶20
The modern class action has become a vital part of
complex civil litigation, addressing problems that involve
fewer than twenty-five 29 plaintiffs to tens of millions. 30 Not
only does it level the playing field between dispersed
plaintiffs and powerful defendants by remedying the
collective action problem and making litigation economically
28

See, e.g., Hamdani & Klement, supra note 25, at 689 (recognizing that both
academics and policymakers have focused on the collective action problems of
plaintiffs more than defendants).
29
See, e.g., Kilgo v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 87 F.R.D. 26, 29–30 (N.D. Ga.
1980) (twenty-three class members sufficient).
30
See, e.g., Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995)
(estimated plaintiff class of fifty million).
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attractive, it also allows the rapid resolution of large numbers
of claims at one time. 31 Without a class action to aggregate
dispersed plaintiffs, defendants are effectively immunized
from suit. In the case of end-user litigation, the lack of an
aggregation device effectively immunizes the plaintiff from
actual litigation and instead approaches an absolute fault
system.
A. Some defendants are not liable
¶21
Plaintiffs would not be able to establish liability in
some of the lawsuits filed if a procedural solution allowed
defendants with legitimate defense to litigate for reasonable
costs. As a result of this deficiency, defendants end up
settling even though they may have a valid defense under
present law.
¶22
For example, the RIAA has misidentified the user and
sued a parent, when the infringing download was actually
committed by an adult child using the same computer. 32 The
defendant may have already bought the copyrighted materials
in another form, such as a CD or DVD. In another case of
mistaken identity, the RIAA sued a deceased grandmother. 33
In other cases, the defendant may have a valid fair-use
defense; such as access to the same materials at a school
library, which were ultimately incorporated into a project or
teaching aid. 34 Another plausible defense is that the statutory
damages available under the Copyright Act, intended for
commercial infringement, are unconstitutionally excessive
when compared to the actual damages suffered by the
plaintiff. 35 A defendant could also raise the affirmative
31

See, e.g., Deborah Hensler & Thomas Rowe, Beyond “It Just Ain't Worth It”:
Alternative Strategies for Damage Class Action Reform, 64 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 137 (2001).
32
Capitol Records Inc. v. Foster, No. Civ. 04-1569-W., 2007 WL 1028532
(W.D. Ok. Feb. 6, 2007) (awarding reasonable attorney's fees to misidentified
parent).
33
See Toby Coleman, Deceased Woman Named in File-sharing Suit,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Feb. 4, 2005, at P1A.
34
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107, 110 (2006). Fair use is a judicial doctrine which has
been codified and includes whether the use is commercial and the effect of the
use on the potential market for the work.
35
See Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Brennan, 534 F.Supp.2d 278, 282 (D. Conn.
2008) (“The defenses which have possible merit include: (1) whether the
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defense that the coordinated behavior of the plaintiffs
amounts to copyright misuse. 36 Nevertheless, it is rare that
these issues are ever litigated because the economies of scale
tip so favorably towards the copyright proprietor plaintiff.
The result is that scholars have little reliable information
regarding the facts of each case or statistics regarding how
many defendants may have succeeded on the merits.
Accordingly, only the most blatant cases of mistaken identity
have come to light.
¶23
One proposed solution to remedy this procedural
asymmetry between plaintiffs and defendants is the class
defense. This would act as a parallel device to the plaintiffs'
class action, but instead would allow a lead defendant to step
forward, argue for certification of a class, and consolidate
defendants' claims. As the Supreme Court has stated, “[o]ne
great advantage of class action treatment of mass tort cases is
the opportunity to save the enormous transaction costs of
piecemeal litigation.” 37 Consolidation also benefits the court
system. By converting defendants' negative expected value
suits into ones that may have a positive expected value, the
court system may resolve these cases without resulting to
mass default judgments.
¶24
The text of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which
governs class actions, does not preclude a defendant class. It
plainly states that members of a class “may sue or be sued as
amount of statutory damages available under the Copyright Act, measured
against the actual money damages suffered, is unconstitutionally excessive.”);
see also UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Lindor, No. CV-05-1095(DGT), 2006 WL
3335048 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2006) (recognizing that plaintiff sought damages of
$750.00 per song; over 1,000 times more the economic actual damages
suffered); In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litigation, No. 04-1671 MHP, 2005 WL
1287611, at *11 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2005) (“[L]arge awards of statutory damages
can raise due process concerns. . . . Extending the reasoning of Gore and its
progeny, a number of courts have recognized that an award of statutory damages
may violate due process if the amount of the award is ‘out of all reasonable
proportion’ to the actual harm caused by a defendant's conduct.”).
36
See, e.g., Assessment Techs. of WI, LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640,
647 (7th Cir. 2003) (“The doctrine of misuse ‘prevents copyright holders from
leveraging their limited monopoly to allow them control of areas outside the
monopoly.’”) (citation omitted).
37
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 860 (1999).
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representative parties on behalf of all members.” 38 If
defendants are able to be sued together, what prevents them
from being able to defend together?
¶25
Under Rule 23 there are four prerequisites that govern
all class cases:
•
•
•
•

the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable
there are questions of law or fact common to the class
the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and
the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class

¶26
The first prong, numerosity, is clearly met. In many
instances, RIAA plaintiffs have attempted to join hundreds of
defendants into the same suit. 39 Instead of joining defendants
and facing severability, 40 the cases could remain bundled
together if certified as a class. 41
¶27
The second prong of the test requires common issues
of law or fact to be present among the class. All class
members would share at least one question of law, such as
whether the “making available” theory 42 pursued by the
RIAA was a copyright infringement, or whether an actual
upload to another user on a peer-to-peer network was required
to violate the distribution right. Some class members would
share common affirmative defenses; some may be innocent of

38

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
See, e.g., Sony Music Entm’t, Inc. v. Does 1-40, 326 F.Supp.2d 556, 567
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
40
See id.
41
See, e.g., Armstead v. Pingree, 629 F.Supp. 273, 278–79 (M.D. Fla. 1986)
(under the numerosity prong “[t]he primary focus is whether joinder of the
proposed class members is impracticable.”).
42
‘Making available’ was a theory of copyright infringement based on
infringing the exclusive distribution right of the copyright owner. See Elektra v.
Barker, (2008 WL 857527) (rejecting RIAA's “making available” theory); see
also RIAA “Making Available” Theory Rejected, SLASHDOT, April 1, 2008,
available at http://news.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=08/04/01/1822246.
39
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any infringement, some may have various fair-use defenses,
and all could raise a common defense of copyright misuse.43
¶28
The third prong, requiring that the defenses be typical
among class members, could be resolved with the use of
defendant subclasses. Rule 23(c)(5) explicitly states that a
class may be subdivided into separate subclasses, each treated
as its own class. One subclass could be raised for each fairuse defense, and all members could join in a subclass raising
copyright misuse, unconstitutionality of the statutory damages
when applied to noncommercial users, and the legal viability
of the ‘making available’ theory, among others.
¶29
The forth prong, adequacy of representation, would
probably require each subclass to have separate
representation; thus ensuring that subclass counsel were not
conflicted. 44 With separate subclass counsel, a class defense
should easily satisfy this requirement.
¶30
Finally, a court should prefer certification of the
defendant class because, without class status, dispersed
defendants will prefer default judgments or adhesion
settlements instead of protecting their legal rights. 45 Cases
will still be manageable through redefining the class and
subclasses. 46
B. Why has a Class Defense not been Employed?

43
See, e.g., Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d
191, 204 (3d Cir. 2003) (“The misuse doctrine extends from the equitable
principle that courts ‘may appropriately withhold their aid where the plaintiff is
using the right asserted contrary to the public interest.’” (quoting Morton Salt
Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942))).
44
See 5 J. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.25(5)(e), at 23–149
(3d ed. 1998) (plaintiff subclass attorney may not serve as class counsel for all
subclasses).
45
See Section III, supra.
46
Bryant Garth, Conflict and Dissent in Class Actions: A Suggested Prospective,
77 NW. U. L. REV. 492, 527 (1982) (“Courts should prefer certification . . . when
an accountable legal rights entity represents the class, the class is too diffuse to
enforce its rights by any other means, or the court can manage dissent through
such mechanisms as subclassing, redefining the class, permitting the
intervention, and structuring the remedy.”).
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¶31
Two major stumbling blocks to the class defense have
been identified: due process concerns for absentee defendants,
and incentives for class attorneys. 47
1. Due Process Concerns for Absentee Defendants.
¶32
The landmark Supreme Court decision in Hansberry
v. Lee has informed our class action jurisprudence for almost
seventy years. 48 The Court outlined the general principal that
a party not properly before the adjudicative body is not bound
by a judgment from that body. 49 However, the Court
recognized an exception to the rule in a class action where the
absentee members had their interest adequately represented
by the class. 50 The Court, recognizing that aggregation was
an accepted part of a court's equity powers, stated that the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments would only be offended
“in those cases where it cannot be said that the procedure
adopted, fairly insures the protection of the interests of absent
parties who are bound by it.” 51 Thus, the absence of a class
member, who cannot voice an opinion in court, is not the
relevant inquiry. Under Hansberry, the inquiry is whether the
processes employed fairly protect the interests of the absent
party. 52 Expanding on Hansberry, the Supreme Court later
stated that, for a money judgment to bind absentees, the
process must include notice, an opportunity to be heard, the
right to opt out, and adequate representation. 53 The process
must be “so devised and applied as to insure that those
present are of the same class as those absent and that the
litigation is so conducted as to insure the full and fair
consideration of the common issue.” 54 The class defendants
do not have to be present. However, they must be afforded the
47

See Hamdani & Klement, supra note 25, at 710.
See William Katt, Res Judicata and Rule 19, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 401, 423–24
(2009).
49
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940) (“It is a principle of general
application in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a
judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or
to which he has not been made a party by service of process.”).
50
Id. at 43.
51
Id. at 42.
52
See, e.g., Richards v. Jefferson County, Ala., 517 U.S. 793, 800-02 (1996).
53
Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985).
54
Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 43.
48
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opportunity to be present, and ensured that if they remain
absent, their interests will be adequately represented.
¶33
The opt-out mechanism, required by Phillips
Petroleum, mollifies due process concerns in plaintiff class
actions, but would need to be slightly adjusted for the class
defense. An opt-out process similar to a plaintiff class action
would unreasonably burden defendants by requiring them to
disclose their identities. This positive act would identify
them to the plaintiff and invite a personal lawsuit. However,
confidential opt-out lists would prevent the disclosure of
members who wish to remain anonymous. 55 Opt-outs could
be filed and remain under seal.
¶34
Due process would also require notice, reasonably
tailored, be given to current and potential defendants. 56
Since future defendants lack any incentive to step forward
and acknowledge that they may have illegally infringed a
copyright, overlapping layers of directed notice and public
notice would be preferred. For example, notice could be
given, through email, to all registered members of YouTube,
MySpace, or all Internet users at a particular university. After
notice, reasonably tailored to reach the defendant class is
delivered, a court could proceed to accept confidential optouts under seal, provide the right to be heard to those seeking
it, and then proceed to judgment.
¶35
Still, the stakes for losing a lawsuit are qualitatively
different for plaintiffs than defendants. A class plaintiff is
losing a hypothetical benefit, which, without the class action,
would never have inured to them. The class defendant,
however, may suffer being bound to a monetary judgment
without knowledge of, much less participation in, the
litigation process. While there is a logical economic
argument that the potential gain to a class plaintiff is little
different than a potential loss to a class defendant, 57 many
judges may be uncomfortable entering a judgment that would
require absent parties to pay substantial out-of-pocket
expenses as soon as the plaintiff identifies them.
55

See Hamdani & Klement, supra note 25, at 725.
See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
57
See Hamdani & Klement, supra note 25, at 719.
56
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¶36
The qualitative difference in a hypothetical benefit
and an unexpected monetary judgment may seem, alone, to be
an insurmountable obstacle to the class defense. However, at
least as early as 1853, the Supreme Court authorized the
division of a common church pension, and stated it was “well
established” that a bill in equity could be maintained against
absentee defendants, so long as they were represented. 58 The
Court later reaffirmed this principle; that the equity powers
extend to bind the property of absent defendants. 59 While the
reduction of funds in a pension is not the same as a judgment
seeking payment, Swormstedt and Brusselback infer that
plaintiffs can receive funds from absent defendants. Indeed,
this was a not-uncommon power exercised under the Federal
Equity Rules.
2. Compensating class counsel
¶37

Another stumbling block for the class defense is that a
successful defense, in a suit for money damages, results in no
money changing hands at all. Thus, class attorneys would not
be able to work on a contingency fee basis as plaintiffs' class
counsel often do. One option would be to create a one-sided
fee shifting rule. Prevailing defendants would be entitled to
the award of attorneys' fees, but not prevailing plaintiffs.
Such a measure, however, would have to be created
legislatively or judicially imposed. 60 Conveniently, many
federal statutes, including the Copyright Act, already contain
fee-shifting provisions. 61
V. THE NEXT STEP: PUTTING THE CLASS DEFENSE INTO PRACTICE
¶38
The application of Rule 13 Counterclaims and Rule
24(c)(5) subclasses to the class defense makes the device
58

See Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. 288, 300-304 (1853).
See Christopher v. Brusselback, 302 U.S. 500, 505 (1938) ( “The omission
from [Equity] Rule 48 . . . of the phrase ‘. . . the decree shall be without
prejudice to the rights and claims of all absent parties,’ preserved unimpaired the
jurisdiction of federal courts of equity in a class suit to render a decree binding
upon absent defendants affecting their interest in property within the jurisdiction
of the court.”).
60
See Hamdani & Klement, supra note 25, at 714-17.
61
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2006).
59
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more palatable. A counterclaim effectively puts the
defendant into the shoes, or the posture, of a plaintiff. 62
Counterclaims seeking declaratory judgments would also
alleviate many of the problems raised as potential hurdles to
the class defense.
¶39
RIAA end-user litigation, as well as many other
potential end-user litigation situations, is based on the
Copyright Act. Section 101 of the Copyright Act, codified at
17 U.S.C. § 505, provides that the prevailing party in
copyright litigation may be awarded attorney's fees, as well as
costs. Compared to many fee-shifting statutes, § 505 treats
both plaintiffs and defendants equally and allows for awards
in either direction; it does not require a showing of
frivolousness for an award to a prevailing defendant. 63 Thus,
concerns about class compensation are mollified, at least to
the extent that non-liable copyright defendants are concerned.
Defendants would not need to show that they did not infringe,
but rather that they were not liable because a valid affirmative
defense was available.
¶40
Counterclaims also resolve some of the due process
issues raised. Since only a declaratory judgment would
sometimes be sought, ascertaining the absolute size of each
defendant subclass would not be required. 64 Instead of
binding the entire defendant class to a settlement or judgment,
the use of counterclaims to launch declaratory judgments
against the common plaintiff would reverse the procedural
posture, allowing defendants to opt-in to a counterclaim
instead of requiring them to opt-out of a class defense.
Subclass affirmative defenses could be raised based on
specific factual situations of lead defendants, with any future
62

See, e.g., In re Dato, 99 F.2d 703, 705 (7th Cir. 1938) (“‘in legal effect, the
defendant becomes plaintiff, and the plaintiff becomes defendant.’” (quoting
Stewart v. Gorham, 122 Iowa 669, 676 (1904))).
63
See, e.g., Riviera Distribs., Inc. v. Jones, 2008 WL 441762 (7th Cir. 2008).
The Seventh Circuit has also held that the prevailing party is presumptively
entitled to attorney’s fees. Woodhaven Homes & Realty, Inc. v. Hotz, 396 F.3d
822, 824 (7th Cir. 2005).
64
See, e.g., Doe v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 529 F.2d 638, 645 (4th Cir. 1975)
(stating that speculative or conclusory representations as to the size of a class
may suffice when money damages are not sought).
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class members who have the same facts then being able to
resolve their cases based on these prior judgments.65
However, certain defenses, such as copyright misuse, are only
affirmative defenses and could not be the basis for affirmative
relief. 66 These could not be counterclaims even if styled as a
declaratory judgment.
CONCLUSION
¶41
On February 28, 2007, the RIAA began a new enduser strategy. Instead of filing John Doe complaints,
hundreds of “pre-litigation” letters were distributed each
month to the physical address corresponding with the IP
addresses of accused infringers. 67 The settlement terms
offered are consistent with those offered during the John Doe
litigation: a form settlement for a non-negotiable amount,
typically around $3,000. 68 With this method, the RIAA saves
the cost of filing complaints, avoids oversight of federal
judges, and achieves nearly the same result. In the first year,
the RIAA sent more than 5,400 letters and allegedly collected
millions of dollars in settlement monies, outside the federal
court system. 69 Recipients of these letters could, of course,
forgo settlement and choose to litigate. However, many of
them had negative expected value suits, and would thus
choose to settle outside the court system even if they had a
valid defense.
65

Defendant class counsel would administer this system, and be able to collect
administration fees from the RIAA plaintiffs each time the plaintiff brought a
case which was based on similar facts to a situation already adjudged to be
protected by an affirmative defense.
66
Maverick Recording Co. v. Chowdhury, No. CV-07-640(DGT), 2008 WL
3884350, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2008) (“[C]opyright misuse is not a basis for
affirmative relief.”).
67
Eliot Van Buskirk, A Poison Pen from the RIAA, WIRED, Feb. 28, 2007,
available at http://www.wired.com/politics/onlinerights/news/2007/02/72834;
Thomas Mennecke, RIAA Announces New Campus Lawsuit Strategy, SLYCK,
Feb. 28, 2007, http://www.slyck.com/story1422.html.
68
Ken Fisher, Students largely ignore RIAA instant settlement offers, ARS
TECHNICA, March 26, 2007, http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/news/2007/03/students-largely-ignore-riaa-instant-settlement-offers.ars.
69
RIAA v. The People: Five Years Later, Whitepaper, Electronic Frontier
Foundation, http://www.eff.org/wp/riaa-v-people-yearslater#footnote75_wr833h5.
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¶42
Finally, at the end of 2008, the RIAA announced it
would not bring any new end-user cases, although the cases
currently filed will continue forward. 70 Whether this marks
the end of RIAA litigation, similar litigation patterns will
likely continue in the future with intellectual property
proprietors suing masses of dispersed defendants, and many
valid claims will be settled on unjust terms unless defendants
are permitted an aggregation device such as a class defense.

70

Thomas Mennecke, RIAA Drops Lawsuit Campaign – Mostly, SLYCK,
December 19, 2008, available at
http://www.slyck.com/story1812_RIAA_Drops_Lawsuit_Campaign_Mostly.

